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Abstract 
This paper adapts a generalized expected utility (GEU) maximization model (Epstein 
and Zin, 1989 and 1991) to examine the intertemporal risk management of wheat producers in 
the Pacific Northwest. Optimization results based on simulated data indicate the feasibility of the 
GEU optimization as a modeling framework. It further extends the GEU model by incorporating 
a welfare measure, the certainty equivalent, to investigate the impacts of U.S. government 
programs and market institutions on farmers’ risk management decisions and welfare. A 
comparison between the GEU and other expected utility models further implies GEU has the 
advantage of specifying farmers’ intertemporal preferences separately and completely. Impact 
analysis results imply that farmers’ optimal hedging is sensitive to changes in the preferences 
and the effects of these preference changes are intertwined. Target price and loan rate levels, 
offered by certain government payment programs, can lead to the substitution of government 
programs for hedging. The evaluation of current risk management tools shows both crop 
insurance and government payments can improve farmers’ welfare significantly. Government 
payment programs have a greater effect on farmers’ welfare than crop insurance and crop 
insurance outperforms hedging.  
 
Classification Code: Q14, D9, C61 
Keywords: generalized expected utility, risk management, multi-period production, dynamic 
optimization, intertemporal preference, market institution, government payments 
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INTERTEMPORAL RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS OF FARMERS UNDER 
PREFERENCE, MARKET, AND POLICY DYNAMICS 
 
 I.  Introduction   
Agricultural production is a dynamic stochastic process greatly affected by 
unpredictable weather, technology advancement, individual farming practices, and price 
fluctuations in commodity markets. The risk management situation confronted by farmers is 
complicated with intra- and inter-temporal uncertainties in continuous multi-period production. 
Modeling farmers’ risk management has been commonly based on a static approach, although a 
stochastic dynamic approach is more consistent with reality.  
Expected utility maximization, commonly used as a standard framework in many 
studies including agricultural risk analysis, has been shown feasible in dynamic modeling. The 
standard specification allows a risk averse farmer to maximize a summarized discounted von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function of his or her stochastic income subject to a set 
of policy and resource constraints. Such a specification, however, assumes utility is additively 
separable and therefore implies the decision maker is intertemporally risk-neutral. A generalized 
expected utility (GEU) maximization model, developed by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), 
provides an alternative to study intertemporal decisions with further specification of the decision 
maker’s preferences. The model utilizes a recursive constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
expected utility function, which allows risk aversion to be disentangled from intertemporal 
substitutability of consumption. 
Currently, U. S. farmers are able to use several risk management tools to manage risks, 
and make long term strategic plans accordingly. Hedging in the futures markets has a long   2
history of being one of the most available and direct risk management tools for farmers. Crop 
insurance, currently facilitated and subsidized by the US federal government, is currently the 
most popular tool used by U.S. crop producers to manage yield and/or price risks. In recent years, 
the federal government increased its involvement in providing and facilitating risk protection 
instrument to farmers through various crop payment programs. The 2002 Farm Bill includes 
three major programs to farmers: a loan deficiency payment (LDP), a direct payment (DP), and a 
counter cyclical payment (CCP). These payment programs work as price insurance but without 
any premium charge. However, the programs are usually offered for a multi-year period. 
Provisions require that farmers make the decision on weather or not to participate in the 
programs at the beginning of the period. 
As new policies and market institutions are constantly developed to improve risk 
protection for farmers, the risk management resources in the US changes over time. The 
aforementioned programs are revisited and adjusted every few years. In order to effectively 
utilize these risk protection programs, farmers need to adjust their expectations as well as risk 
management strategies throughout the production process.  
Farmers’ decision making and welfare are based on individual preferences in a given 
risk and policy environment. In the GEU specification, a decision maker’s expected utility is 
subject to changes in three types of preferences: risk aversion, time discounting, and 
intertemporal substitutability. His or her intertemporal decisions are determined by the mutual 
effects of all these preferences. Uncertainty about consumption is resolved over time and 
preference orderings generally imply non-indifference to the way it resolves. The model provides 
a possibility to study farmers’ intertemporal risk management decisions while considering their 
preferences toward risk, time, and inter-year substitution of consumption. It also allows us to   3
examine the impacts of changing market institutions and U.S. agricultural policies on farmers’ 
behavior at the same time.  
The objectives of this paper are 1) apply the GEU model to farmers’ intertemporal 
portfolio risk management decisions and compare it with other commonly used additive EU 
models as a framework in such decisions. Farmers’ choose from hedging instruments, insurance 
products, and government payment programs to maximize utility. 2) investigate the impacts of 
intertemporal preferences towards risk, substitution, and time, as well as market institutions and 
policy alternatives, on farmers’ risk management behavior based on the GEU model. We are 
interested in evaluating the different risk management tools and weighing their roles in risk 
management portfolios.  
Specifically, the paper proceeds as follows: 1) Section II reviews literature in 
agricultural risk management modeling; 2) Section III discusses the model structure; 3) Section 
IV introduces the data and the simulation of yields and prices; 4) Section V discusses the 
optimization and model comparison results; 5) Section VI presents the impact analyzes of 
intertemporal preferences, market institutions, and policy alternatives on risk management 
decisions; and 6) Section VIII summarizes findings and draws conclusion. 
 
II. Existing Literature 
As a modeling framework, the expected utility (EU) maximization approach has been 
applied to producers’ risk analysis in both static and dynamic situations since the 1970s.  
However, unlike its counterparts in economics and finance, a large amount of the existing work 
only use EU under static scenarios in agricultural economics (Nyambane et al., 2002).     4
In the standard specification of intertemporal EU maximization, it is common to assume 
an additive and homogeneous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index. Such a specification, 
however, intertwines two distinct aspects of preference, intertemporal substitutability and 
relative risk aversion (Epstein and Zin, 1989).  Additionally, these models did not perform well 
in empirical examinations (Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Mehra and Prescott, 1985). As a more 
general framework, the GEU model adds extra flexibility in identifying intertemporal 
substitution and is able to disentangle the intertemporal substitution from the risk aversion.  
With the possible and testable separability for risk preference and intertemporal 
substitutability, it is possible to use the GEU model to estimate preference parameters separately 
and examine the form of the objective function. Continuing on from their theoretical paper, 
Epstein and Zin (1991) empirically investigated the parameter estimation and the testable 
restrictions. They got favorable and theoretically consistent estimates. Lence (2000) used 1936-
1994 U.S. farm data to study the fitness of a GEU framework. He found the estimated farmers’ 
utility parameters satisfy the theoretical restrictions of the GEU model.  Furthermore, the EU 
model is rejected in favor of the GEU model. The empirical results from resource economics 
studies using the GEU model (Knapp and Olson,1996; Howitt et al. 2002) underscore the 
importance of using the more general specification of intertemporal preferences.  
On the other hand, studies on agricultural risk management strategies have been 
extended from the earlier one-element models to portfolio models, and focus more on the 
interactions and relative impacts of the instruments within a portfolio. Among them are 
portfolios of crop yield insurance and futures contracts (Myers, 1988), futures market and 
government farm programs (Crain and Lee, 1996), crop yield insurance, futures, options and   5
government programs (Wang, et al., 1998), and crop revenue insurance, futures and government 
programs (Zuniga, Coble, and Heifner, 2001; Wang, Makus, and Chen, 2004).  
Studies on measuring farmers’ welfare change are found in literature, but very few 
concentrate on farmers’ welfare changes under different risk management portfolios. Wang, et al 
(1998) found Iowa corn farmers’ willingness-to-pay decreases as the trigger yield level of crop 
insurance increases at a decreasing rate. Mahul (2003) found futures and options would improve 
French wheat producers’ willingness-to-receive when hedging is used in the presence of crop 
insurance. Wang, Makus and Chen (2004) found U.S. farm program payments account for the 
primary value of all risk management portfolios for Pacific Northwest dryland grain producers. 
Adaptation of the GEU framework specifically to agricultural risk management 
portfolio studies is rarely found in the literature. Other possible applications of GEU, like 
sensitivity analyses of dynamic optimization solutions with respect to a decision maker’s 
preferences and other exogenous variables, have not been explored. No one has attempted 
developing a welfare measure in GEU models. This paper will make an effort to contribute to the 
literature from this perspective.  
 
III. Model  
Theoretical Framework 
The foundation of the GEU model for intertemporal analysis builds on the independent 
works of Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), and Weil (1990). In this study we focus on Epstein and 
Zin’s approach.  
The representation of the general preference for a decision maker under risk can be 
identified as:   6
(1)                                              () ()
1
1 1 tt t t MaxU C E U
ρ ρ
ρα α ββ +
     =− +      
  
where ) (⋅ t U  is the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function indexed by timet;  t E is the 
expectation operator at current period t; the “~” above U indicates the stochastic property of 
utility. β ( 1 0 < < β ) is the discount factor per period and implicitly defines the decision maker’s 
time preference. By consuming at 1 + t , he/she only consumes a fraction (β ) of the utility that 
would have been consumed att. α ( 1 0 < ≠ α ) denotes the risk aversion parameter, and is equal 
to one minus the Arrow-Pratt constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient. A smallerα  
indicates greater risk aversion. ρ ( 1 0 < ≠ ρ ) denotes the intertemporal substitutability, equal 
to
1 ) 1 (
− −σ withσ denoting the elasticity of substitution. Early (late) resolution of risk would be 
preferred if ρ α ) (> < .  t C denotes the current consumption which is a function of the risky 
variables and the risk management choice variables. The decision maker’s objective function is 
to maximize current utility, which comprehensively incorporates all of the lifetime expected 
future utilities.  
The recursive GEU specification enables a separation of risk aversion from 
intertemporal substitution and the non-additive intertemporal preference relations. This feature is 
not usually shared by the EU specification. However, the GEU form nests the EU form as a 
special case. The recursive CES EU (CES-EU) preferences, widely used in finance, 
macroeconomics and intertemporal consumption analysis, are obtained when we impose the 
parametric restriction ρ α = . 
(2)                                                 () () {} 1
1
tt t t Max U = 1- β C+ β EU
αα α
+    
              (CES-EU)   7
Moreover, the standard multi-period recursive EU (MR-EU) preference is obtained 
when we further impose 1 α ρ == . As indicated in equation (3), when the utility function is 
defined as a linear combination of current and future consumption levels, the optimization of 
MR-EU becomes a decision maker maximizing the summarized discounted expected 
consumption over a lifetime (finite or infinite time periods). 
 (3)                                                 () ()
i
tt t t i
i
MaxU 1- C E C ββ +
  =+     ∑                   (MR-EU) 
Here  ti C +  denotes consumption for the
th i period in the future. With risk preference 1 α = , the 
decision maker is risk neutral. The additive specification due to  1 ρ =  implicitly assumes 
preferences are homogeneous (perfectly substitutable) over time; each one of them carries the 
same weight when discounted to the current period. Such additivity is now well known to be too 
restrictive (Weil, 1990). Decision makers may have a clear preference for early resolution of risk 
compared to late resolution of risk (Kreps and Porteus, 1978).  
Application of GEU to Farmers’ Intertemporal Decisions in the PNW 
When applying the GEU framework to our optimization problem, current consumption 
is further defined as net income from the farmer’s wheat production and risk management. The 
farmer uses futures contract, yield insurance, and government programs to construct risk 
management portfolios. Hedge ratios and insurance coverage ratios are endogenous choice 
variables to be determined at the optimum, based on information available at t-1: 
(4)                Ct = NCt + CIt + FIt + GIt  
               where NCt = PtYt –PCt, 
FIt = xt-1[Ft – Et-1(Ft)]-TCt, 
CIt = Pb max[0, zt-1 E t-1 (Yt) - Yt] -  Pret    8
GIt = DPt + LDPt + CCPt 
Where DPt = 0.85PD×0.9Et-1(Yt), 
LDPt = Et-1(Yt) max(0, LR - Pt), 
                   CCPt = 0.85×0.935 Et-1(Yt) max[0, PT - PD - max(Pt ,LR)] 
where NCt is the net income from producing and selling the crops in the cash market; CIt is the 
net income from purchasing yield-based Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI); FIt is the net 
income from hedging in the futures market; and GIt is the net income from government programs.  
Pt and Yt represent cash prices
1 and yields for winter wheat at harvest time respectively, 
with PCt as the production cost. Ft is the futures price at time t and the futures market is treated 
as unbiased.  xt-1 is the hedging amount determined at a previous time period which is positive 
for a long position and negative for a short position. xt-1 is in bold face to indicate its status as a 
choice variable. TCt is the transaction cost of trading futures. Pb is the base price used to 
calculate the indemnity from crop insurance with Pret as the premium
2. zt-1 is the coverage 
selection of the insurance and is also in bold face to indicate a choice variable. DP is the direct 
payment program which gives a constant payment to farmers, LDP is the loan deficiency 
payment, and CCP is the counter cyclical payment. PD is the direct payment rate, LR is the loan 
rate, and PT is the target price.
  The formulation of DP, LDP, and CCP is specified according to 
the 2002 Farm Bill and calibrated to PNW wheat growers, the chosen area for the empirical 
analysis.  
Due to the nonlinearity in the objective function and the random interrelationships 
among variables, closed-form optimal solutions are unavailable in the dynamic optimization. 
Therefore empirical solutions are obtained by numerical methods. For the dynamic optimization, 
                                                 
1 Cash price is a farm gate price after transportation cost is deducted from the spot market cash price. 
2 The premium of the current year’s crop insurance is paid at harvest time.   9
we simulate yields and prices for the next five years. Optimal levels of crop insurance coverage 
and hedge ratios are determined simultaneously and intertemporally in the presence of 
government programs.  
Evaluation of Risk Management Portfolios 
 To further measure the risk management value and the income transfer value of 
alternative risk management instruments to the farmer, we reconstruct the consumption in the 
GEU model by introducing a certainty equivalent (CE) variable. We choose CE to evaluate 
alternative risk management portfolios relative to cash sales, under certain specified preference 
sets. Here CE is the certain amount of money that would be offered to the farmer in every period 
to keep him or her as well off as providing the farmer with the specified risk management 
portfolio. CE can be calculated by solving: 
(5)              
** * 0 0 0 0
12 1 2 ( , ( , ,..., )) ( , ( , ,..., )) tttt t t i tt tt t t i UCEC C C UCEC C E C C E C C E ++ + + + + =+ + +  
where 
* , 1,2,..., ti Ci + =  is the optimal consumption (net income) under a specific portfolio in the 
next i
th period, and 
0 , 1,2,..., ti Ci + =  is the net income from selling in the cash market which is 
defined as the NCt for that period. 
 
IV. Data, Simulation and Model Calibration 
Data Source 
The risk management situation in the Pacific Northwest (PNW) provides us with an 
interesting case to explore farmers’ risk management decisions in this area. The PNW, covering 
Washington, Idaho, California, and Oregon, is one of the major wheat production areas in the US. 
There is a large acreage of non-irrigated farms in this region. Soft white winter wheat has been 
the dominant cash crop and is primarily exported to the Asian market. This region, however, has   10
historically been an area with low utilization rates of risk management instruments like futures 
(Makus, et al., 1990) and some acreage-based crop insurance (Vandeveer and Young, 2000).  
We select a representative farmer from each of the two counties, Whitman County and 
Grant County, in Washington State. Although both represent dryland soft white wheat farming 
region in the Pacific Northwest (PNW), these two counties have different levels of precipitation. 
Whitman County sits on the east central border of Washington and is part of the highest yield 
area for soft white wheat in the state. Whitman County has an average annual precipitation of 
around 14 inches. In comparison, Grant County is located in the center of the state and does not 
border Whitman County. Grant County is much dryer with an average annual rainfall of 5 inches 
in 2002. Accordingly, wheat production is riskier in Grant County. However, since there is some 
irrigation in Grant County, the yield is not much lower than that in Whitman County (Figure 1).  
Historical data for soft white wheat yield, cash price and futures price for Whitman 
County and Grant County are collected and examined to identify time series patterns for 
simulation. The yield data for Whitman County and Grant County in Washington State are 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Agricultural National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(http://www.usda.gov/nass/) and Risk Management Agency (RMA) at annual basis for 1939-
2003 and 1972-2003, respectively.  
Annual September wheat cash and futures prices from 1973 to 2003 are selected to 
represent harvest prices.  September is the time when the farmer makes decisions on the 
following year’s hedging and insurance participation, and prepares for the planting of next year’s 
winter wheat crop. For cash price, we use the monthly average of daily September prices at the 
Portland spot market. The data are from the USDA-ERS Wheat Yearbook 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/so/view.asp?f=field/whs-bb/). Since the PNW region   11
grows soft white wheat which has no actively traded futures contract, the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) September wheat futures contact is chosen by the farmer for hedging. We pick 
the mid-week price of the first week (Wednesday or Thursday) of September to develop our 
dataset.  
Deterministic Trend vs. Stochastic Trend 
Because of the multiple time dimensions involved in GEU specification and dynamic 
programming, simulation of yield data could affect the final optimization results to a large extent. 
Specifying a pattern that is consistent with real processes is critical in this study.  
From the time series plots of Whitman County and Grant County yield (Figure 1) for 
1972 to 2003, an upward trend is visible for the last 32 years. There are possibly two sources of 
randomness that influence the county yield time series. One is the stochastic technology changes 
that will determine the “mean” yield in any given year, and the other is the random weather that 
moves the yield around the “mean”. For multi-period analysis, we need to model the long-run 
inter-year randomness from technology changes as well as the short-run random effects brought 
by weather. A stochastic trend model would be more appropriate than any deterministic trend 
models in that it incorporates both types of randomness.  
Moss and Shonkwiler (1993) developed a single time-dependent stochastic trend model.  
Their model transforms the error term rather than the dependent variable to incorporate the 
possibility of both non-stationary data and non-normal errors in corn yield variation. The model 
is also general enough to include both the standard deterministic time trend and normal errors as 
special cases. This model is adopted for our analysis.  
Similarly for wheat cash and futures prices (Figure 2), the long-run unpredictable 
balance of supply and demand determines the annual price trend, and short-run information at   12
the market and other factors add more price variability around the trend. Therefore, this 
stochastic trend model is also fitted to price data. 
The model consists of one measurement equation and two transition equations: 
(6)                                                                     t t t y ε µ + =  
                                                                          t t t t η β µ µ + + = − − 1 1  
                                                                          t t t ς β β + = −1  
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t  is the error vector describing the long run randomness in the 
transition equation that governs the evolution of the state vector. Both of the errors in the 
measurement equation follow normal distributions and are independent of each other.  
In the basic specification,  t µ , the mean component of the dependent variable, is shown 
as a random walk with a drift. Therefore the final generalization shows that the mean of the 
dependent variable grows at a random rate.  
                                                 
3 The model also allows for a non-normal errors when  t ε  is assumed to be generated by an inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation from normality:  () ~ ( 0 , 1 ) tt eN τ δ = − , and  
() {}
1
2 1 2 ln 1 tt t τθ θ ε θ ε
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=+ +  

 where δ  is the non-centrality parameter;  ) 0 ( 0 < > δ  denotes the 
distribution is skewed to the right (left) and if  0 = δ  the distribution is symmetric. θ  is associated with 
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The stochastic trend model reduces to a deterministic time trend model if  0 0 β ≠  
and 0
2 2 = = ς η σ σ . If  0 0 = β , then it reduces to a constant mean regression model.  
Estimation and Simulation for Yields and Prices 
Applying the stochastic trend model to our yield and price data using maximum 
likelihood estimation programmed in GAUSS, we find there is no stochastic trend in the yield for 
Whitman County but there is one for Grant County. The stochastic trend also exists in the 
Portland cash prices and CBOT futures prices (Table 1).  
For Grant County yield, cash price and futures price, the significance of estimated  η σ  
confirms the existence of a random walk in the mean component. However, the insignificance of 
estimated  ς σ  shows such stochastic variation doesn’t exist within the mean of the trend. For 
Whitman County yield, however, the trend is generally a deterministic time trend and there is no 
significant randomness in the slope of the time trend. The simple linear regression model with a 
deterministic time trend appears to be a good model for Whitman County yield
4. 
The plots of predicted values versus actual values show that in general the stochastic 
trend models fit the data well by capturing the long-run variation in the trend for wheat yield in 
Grant County (Figure 3) and cash prices (Figure 4)
5. The 95 percent confidence intervals include 
nearly all of the realizations.     
For the distributions of yield and prices, we conduct normality tests first on the 
detrended data. Results fail to reject the null hypothesis of normality. We also estimate the 
stochastic trend model including non-normal errors. The estimates of the non-normal parameters 
are not statistically different from zero, confirming that the data follow a normal distribution.  
                                                 
4 We further tested for autocorrelation within the series before applying the time trend and found no 
evidence.  
5 Similar pattern is also shown for wheat futures prices.    14
We use the fitted linear time trend model to simulate annual wheat yields in Whitman 
County, and use the fitted stochastic trend models to simulate Grant County yield, Portland Cash 
price, and CBOT futures price. An empirical distribution with 2000 samples is simulated for 
each of the next five years and for each series. All the series are first simulated independently 
without autocorrelations or contemporaneous correlations. For the cash and futures prices, we 
then impose a correlation of 0.871 based on historical data. Table 2 gives the descriptive 
statistics of the simulated data.  
Parameter Calibration 
Identification of farmers’ risk preferences and time preferences has been attempted in 
previous studies using different models (Saha, Shumway and Talpaz, 1994; Chavaz and Holt, 
1996; Epstein and Zin, 1990; Lence, 2000).  Among them, Lence used a similar dynamic GEU 
model to estimate US farmers’ preference parameters based on aggregated consumption and 
asset return data from 1966-1994. We implement those estimates, 13 . 0 − = α , 0.89 β =  and 
0.9493 ρ = , as the base for our representative farmers and assume they stay fixed over time. 
In the determination of current consumption (or net income) level, transportation cost 
between the Portland spot market and the two counties is set at $0.50 per bushel for Whitman 
County and $0.47 for Grant County; production cost is determined as $203 per acre for Whitman 
County (Hinman and Baldree, 2004) and $195 for Grant County
6; transaction cost associated 
with hedging is set at $0.017/bushel. The price used to indemnify crop loss in the insurance 
programs is the CBOT September wheat futures price plus a Portland basis of $0.45 per bushel. 
The insurance coverage levels are restricted to be either zero or from 50% to 85% with an 
increment of 5%. The insurance premium is computed as the product of the expected indemnity 
                                                 
6 Production cost for Grant County is derived based on budgeting report for Lincoln County, a similarly 
dry county in Washington State.  Reference: Esser, Hinman, and Platt (2003).    15
(actuarially fair premium level) and 1 minus the regressive subsidy rate specified in current 
policies
7.   
For government programs, the direct payment rate PD is set at $0.52 per bushel. The 
base yield used to calculate a per acre payment is set at 90 percent of the expected yield. The 
loan rate (LR) for the LDP is $2.86 per bushel for soft white wheat in Whitman County and $2.91 
per bushel in Grant County. The target price (PT) for CCP is $3.92 per bushel. These parameters 
are based on current US farm policies. 
 
V. GEU Maximization and Comparison with EU maximization 
We implement the stochastic dynamic optimization programming using GAUSS and 
numerically solve for the optimal hedge ratios and crop insurance coverage ratios for our 
representative farmers in the two Washington State counties (Whitman and Grant). Results are 
shown in Table 3. Note that all the hedge ratios are reported without the negative sign, which 
indicates hedging is in short position in all cases. 
As we can see, the specification of the GEU model gives us extra flexibility in the 
parameterization of the objective function. We are able to explore the feasibility of the GEU 
model as well as to compare the results from GEU optimization with those from other widely 
used expected utility optimization models. The first scenario GEU full ( 13 . 0 − = α ,  0.89 β =  
and  0.9493 ρ = ) is our base scenario. It represents the farmer who is risk averse ( 1 α < ), has 
high intertemporal substitutability of consumption (ρ close to 1), and prefers an early resolution 
of the risk to a late resolution (α ρ < ). The farmer discounts future consumption by a factor of 
89% and makes a decision for the next five years based on all available information as of today.  
                                                 
7 The subsidy rate corresponding to the coverage levels of 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, and 85 percent are 
respectively, 67, 64, 64, 59, 59, 55, 48, and 38 percent.    16
Other scenarios of interest in our study include the two special cases of the GEU base 
model, CES-EU optimization with  1 α ρ = =−  and 0.89 β = , and MR-EU optimization with 
1 α ρ ==  and  0.89 β = . The former refers to the case where the farmer is more risk averse and 
has smaller intertemporal substitution preference in consumption, while the latter refers to the 
case when he/she is risk neutral and has perfect intertemporal substitution preference.  
Besides the CES-EU and MR-EU, a multi-period additive EU (MA-EU) optimization is 








=  where  1 α =− , which implies a relative risk aversion coefficient equal 
to 2. This utility function has been widely used in static single-period risk analyses (Mahul, 2003; 
Wang, Makus, and Chen, 2004; Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga, 2000). It is also easy to extend the 
model from single-period to multi-period as in equation (7), but note that this multi-period 
version has a static nature. 
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                   (MA-EU) 
Table 3 lists results of the Whitman County and Grant County farmers’ optimal choice 
on risk management portfolios using the four different models. In general, we see that 
parameterization of intertemporal preferences determines the model specification, and the model 
specification is very important in modeling farmer’s risk management behavior and finding the 
optimal portfolios for farmers’ intertemporal decision.  
For the optimal choice of crop insurance, the highest coverage of 85% is favored in all 
cases. This result is consistent with the model setting since the insurance is subsidized by the 
government and no premium loading is charged. The farmer purchases the highest available level 
so as to enjoy the most protection against yield risk and receive the highest subsidy. Also, the   17
government commodity programs provide free price protection with a sizable expected income 
transfer.  The farmer will always participate, which reduces the need for futures hedging. 
From the hedge ratios, we can see the hedging levels are always below 32%. This is 
because first there is a transaction cost charged for hedging. Second, the government LDP and 
CCP programs also have price risk reduction features, which leads to a crowding out effect on 
hedging. Similar results are reported in Wang, Makus, and Chen (2004). The pattern of the hedge 
ratio is different in the GEU base model relative to the other models, and the level of hedging is 
slightly higher in the GEU full optimization. With risk aversion, time preference, and 
intertemporal substitution separately specified, the GEU full model shows the farmer’s optimal 
hedge ratios is increasing over the first four years. The generally higher level of hedging, 
compared with results from other alternative models, implies he/she prefers to resolve the risk 
earlier rather than later. Although the farmer prefers an early resolution of risk, his or her 
relatively high intertemporal substitutability of consumption may balance the preference in a way 
that hedging would be kept at a nondecreasing rate to meet the relative volatility changes. In the 
fifth and final year, the farmer would reduce spending on hedging and accept more risk.  
In the CES-EU model, the farmer’s risk aversion and intertemporal substitution of 
consumption is integrated as one preference. The optimal hedge ratio is higher in the first year 
and then becomes lower in the second through the fifth years compared to the corresponding 
ratios in the GEU full model. The CES-EU model also displays a decreasing pattern over the five 
years. The higher level of hedging in the first year is consistent with the farmer’s higher risk 
aversion. The pattern switches for the second year, however. Since the risk aversion and 
substitution preference are mixed together in this case, the effects of the two preferences are hard   18
to differentiate in a cross-year setting. They may be competing against or reconciling with each 
other, which, neither of which is observable.   
The CES-EU results are comparable to the MA-EU results in that they both share the 
same risk aversion. Interestingly, these two models yield nearly the same optimal hedge ratios. 
We have further checked with other risk aversion values including  2 α = −  and  0.5 α = , and get 
similar results. The comparison gives the impression that these two models work very similarly 
in modeling the optimization behavior for the decision maker’s risk management. This result 
indicates that although the GEU does not include the popular additive EU models for risk 
averters, its CES-EU component is equivalent. So, GEU is perhaps more general than it appears. 
As a very special case of the GEU model, the MR-EU model applies to a farmer who is 
risk neutral and has perfect intertemporal substitutability in consumption. Consistent with these 
preferences, the optimal hedging ratio is zero for each year, reinforcing that the decision maker 
does not care about risks and has no specific concerns regarding consumption across years.  
Optimal choices for the representative farmer in Grant County are very similar to 
Whitman County. The farmer prefers slightly less hedging than the Whitman farmer but still 
buys the same coverage of crop insurance. Although the production is riskier in Grant County 
because yield is a bit more stochastic, there is no huge gap between the yield levels as shown in 
the historical data (Figure 2.1). Also we assume farmers in both counties face the same prices, so 
they are exposed to the same price risks. The hedge ratios are very close to those in Whitman 
County under the same preference set.  
In summary, the comparisons between the four models for Whitman County and Grant 
County in Washington State show that the GEU model is feasible by yielding reasonable results 
on optimal risk management portfolios. For a farm planning on multi-period management, GEU   19
shows an optimal strategy that is more consistent with reality on hedging and crop insurance for 
the decision maker, who wants to maximize utility over the whole time span. The GEU model 
framework is also flexible enough to account for separate risk, time, and substitution preferences, 
and is able to incorporate other commonly used EU models that have either ignored 
intertemporal substitution preference or integrated such substitution with risk preference. 
 
VI. The Impacts of Preference, Market, and Policy Dynamics  
For this part of analysis, we only focus on Whitman County wheat growers. Based on 
the GEU maximization, we examine the impacts of risk aversion, time preference, and 
intertemporal substitutability on farmers’ optimal choice of hedging and crop insurance 
participation through parameterization of the preferences. By setting the price instruments with 
futures contracts, insurance policies, and government payments at different levels, we examine 
the impacts of market institutions. In addition, we investigate the relative impacts of each of the 
major risk management tools through various ways of constructing a risk management portfolio. 
These impacts are not only reflected in the optimal level of hedge ratios, but also in the cash 
value associated with the choice.  
In order to differentiate the impacts of intertemporal preferences from those of market 
and policy alternatives, we consider two steps. First, assume the set of policy and market risk 
management tools stays the same while farmer’s preferences vary, with the preferences changing 
one at a time. Second, change the parameters related with hedging, crop insurance, and 
government programs, for one tool at a time, when preferences are set at the base level.  
Impacts of Preferences: Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and Intertemporal Substitutability    20
We solve the GEU optimization problem by dynamic programming using GAUSS for 
risk aversion parameter ranging from -5 to 1 (Arrow-Pratt CRRA coefficient from 0 to 6), time 
discount factor from 0.1 to 0.9, and substitution preference from -5 to 1. The examinations are 
conducted separately for each of the preferences. We change only one preference parameter at a 
time, while holding the other two preferences at the same level as in the base scenario. 
Theoretical restrictions on the parameters have been considered so that only feasible values were 
assigned within each range.  
At this time, the farmer can choose from hedging in the commodity futures market and a 
no-load MPCI yield insurance. He or she is also able to receive government payments through 
DP, LDP, and CCP. The parameterization for these risk management instruments is at the base 
level. Results show that differences in the optimal portfolio are only in hedge ratios, the crop 
insurance purchase ratios are always at 85% level. Therefore, we focus on the variation in hedge 
ratios in the following discussion. 
Risk Aversion 
Figure 3.1 displays how hedge ratios in the next five years respond to risk aversion (α ) 
changes
8. In general, the farmer’s optimal hedge ratios
9 are sensitive to variations inα . In the 
first year, which is the most responsive, a 1% increase in α  (from around -3 to close to 1) results 
in a 0.74% decrease in the hedge ratio (from 35% to close to 0). Regarding the evolution of 
hedge ratios for each year, it shows a similar pattern throughout the five years. All ratios first 
increase very slowly when the farmer’s risk aversion varies at higher levels (α from -3 to -1 or 
CRRA from 4 to 2). Then the ratios switch one by one to decrease as risk aversion gets smaller. 
                                                 
8 We only select some “typical” values of risk aversion to display in the graph for space consideration. We 
did the same in the graphs of time preference and intertemporal substitutability. Complete results are 
available upon request. 
9 Here all hedge ratios are in short positions. When referring to hedge ratios, we usually mean the 
magnitude rather than the sign unless specifically stated.    21
Specifically, the turning points are atα equal to -3, -2, -0.8, 0.2, and 0.4 for the first until fifth 
year, respectively. After the turning point, hedge ratios generally decrease at a faster rate. This 
decreasing pattern seems more consistent with the intuition that less risk averse people would 
tend to hedge less. However, the increasing pattern before the turning point is still possible to 
happen. Similar patterns have been seen in empirical dynamic hedging research (Martinez and 
Zering, 1992).  
At a specific risk aversion level, the optimal hedging level appears to decrease over the 
five years if the farmer is highly risk averse (α less than -2). The pattern is almost reversed if the 
farmer is not very risk averse (α greater than 0.2). For farmers who have mild risk aversion, the 
pattern is mixed. Depending on the specific point he or she is at, the farmer may hedge more 
either in the early stages or in the later stages. Theoretically,  ρ α ) (> < indicates the decision 
maker prefers early (late) resolution. Therefore when the farmer is very risk averse, he or she 
would want to resolve risk as early as possible by hedging more in early years, and vice versa. 
However, hedging reduces risks but also costs the farmers some certain income because of the 
futures transaction cost. Asα and ρ get close, althoughα ρ < holds for the entire range in Figure 
5, the preference of early resolution gets weak and the time discount of fixed transaction cost 
makes the farmer want to hedge less earlier and more later. Similar observations also exist in the 
sensitivities of time preference and intertemporal substitution. 
Time Preference 
From Figure 6 we notice that the hedge ratios are responsive to time preference changes 
but not as much as to risk aversion. The most responsive ratio is for the first year, but it only 
varies between 32% and 25%. Ratios for the second to fourth year only change from 30% to 32%, 
and ratio for the fifth year has only minor changes. Second, hedge ratios have a convex pattern   22
but only the turning points for the first two years (β =0.3 and 0.5, respectively) are observable 
within the range ofβ . Third, for the last year when farming is about to end, the hedge ratio is 
always around 25.5% for allβ levels, quite different from the other years, especially those for the 
second to fourth year.  
Sinceβ is defined as the time discount factor, by postponing consumption to next period 
the farmer only gets a fraction (β ) of the utility that he or she would get by consuming an equal 
amount during the current period. Therefore with a higherβ , the farmer will have a greater 
propensity to consume in the future instead of the current time period. In our case, asβ becomes 
bigger or the future consumption is less discounted, the farmer values the future income and 
income risk more than today’s, and hedging decreases in the early years. The hedge ratios are 
increasing during the third until fifth year over allβ values, and increasing for the first two years 
beforeβ gets to the turning point.  
At a specific time preference level, the farmer tends to hedge more in earlier years due 
to a preference for an early resolution of consumption risk. This pattern is more obvious in hedge 
ratios whenβ is low, but it then slowly changes as hedge ratios move to the turning point.  
Intertemporal Substitutability 
Optimal hedge ratios are generally sensitive to changes in intertemporal substitutability 
as shown in figure 7. Hedging percentages are primarily increasing as ρ  gets larger. The pattern 
switches when ρ reaches the turning point in the first and second year.    
A larger ρ represents a more substitution of consumption across years. Therefore, 
optimal hedge ratios differ for large versus small ρ  values across the first four years, most 
noticeably in the third and fourth year. For a range between -5 to 0.8, the increase inρ for a   23
given ( 0.13) α α =− also affects attitudes towards risk and timing. The farmer’s preference 
toward resolution of risk will change from late to early. Combined with the increasing 
substitution effect of late consumption for early consumption, it can be seen that hedge ratios for 
the first four years change relative to each other.    
In summary, sensitivity analysis of intertemporal preferences shows that optimal 
hedging behavior of the representative farmer is sensitive to intertemporal preferences change. 
Risk aversion appears to have a larger effect on hedge ratios than time preference and 
intertemporal substitutability. Each of the preferences seems to have a different pattern of impact. 
But even in the separate analysis, the effect is often intertwined with influences from the other 
preferences due to relative value changes among them.  
Impacts of Market Institutions: Transaction Cost and Insurance Premium Loading 
Transaction costs related to futures contracts and insurance premiums are the major 
costs farmers pay for using hedging to reduce price risk and crop insurance to manage yield or 
revenue risks. To examine how these institutions affect farmers’ risk management decisions, we 
set up different levels for transaction cost and premium loading, while other parameters in the 
model remain fixed. The impacts of transaction costs and insurance premium loading are studied 
in detail based on the base model in this section. We also briefly discuss the impacts of these two 
factors based on results from other EU-type models in a later section. 
Transaction costs are what farmers must sacrifice from current income to receive future 
market price protection if they choose hedging to reduce price risk. When transaction costs are 
charged, hedging has offsetting impacts. More hedging improves farmers’ expected utility 
through price risk protection, but it also reduces utility by directly lowering current consumption. 
Using the base model where all tools are included, we first let transaction cost vary from   24
$0/bushel to $0.02/bushel, including the current market level $0.017/bushel, at an increment of 
$0.001. Because the CCP in government programs also has a market price protection function, 
we remove the CCP from the risk management pool and make hedging the only tool to reduce 
price risk. The summarized optimal hedge ratio changes are reported in Figure 8 and Table 4.  
Figure 8 displays how the hedge ratios react to variations in transaction cost for the first 
year. A similar pattern is also exhibited in the second through fifth year, but the ratios are at 
decreasing levels as implied by Table 4
10. The optimal hedge ratios generally display a 
decreasing trend as transaction costs increase, and the amount of the change is quite small. From 
the upper panel in Table 4, we can see that 1% change in transaction costs result in about 0.3% 
change in the hedge ratio during the first year when the government CCP is included. The 
implication is that for our representative farmer, hedging is responsive but not very sensitive, to 
changes in transaction costs when free government price protection is available.  
Comparing the lower panel with the upper panel in Table 4 shows that after the CCP is 
removed, the hedge ratio increases by 45%, from 0.42 to 0.61, given the same transaction cost 
variation. Without the CCP, the ratios also appear to decrease faster from the first year to the 
fifth year, implying by the steeper slope of the trend line. This suggests a smaller tolerance to a 
transaction cost increase without assistance from the CCP.  
To find out the impact of premium loading charged for crop insurance purchases, we 
examined the optimal insurance coverage in response to changes in loading from 0% to 30%, 
with an increment of 5%. Our results based on the base model and various other portfolios show 
(Table 5), however, that farmers would always choose to buy the highest available coverage of 
85%. One possible explanation for this could be that the crop insurance is heavily subsidized by 
the government. Therefore, although our representative farmer needs to pay up to 30% more on 
                                                 
10 Complete results are available upon request.   25
premiums, the expected return from participating in the insurance program is still higher than the 
cost. Accordingly, it is beneficial to buy insurance at 85% rather than any lower coverage level.       
In summary, the impact analysis of market institutions shows that farmers are more 
responsive to the changes in transaction cost than in insurance premium. But the responsiveness 
in hedge ratios to transaction cost is relatively small, indicating hedging might not be a major 
consideration in farmers’ risk management decisions. Our representative farmer would always 
choose to purchase insurance at the highest level 85%. Apparently the expected return due to 
crop insurance premium subsidies covers the expenses due to premium loading up to 30%. 
Impacts of Government Price Protection: Target Price and Loan Rate 
Apart from hedging, government programs also contain elements of market price 
protection. Base on values of the parameters for the target price (PT) and loan rate (LR) relative to 
the expected market price, farmers receive price protection. Here we study the impacts of these 
two parameters by changing their values hypothetically, while keeping the expected cash price 
based on simulated distribution fixed for the next five years.  
The impacts of these two parameters based on base model optimization are combined in 
one graph as shown in Figure 9. The graph shows how optimal hedge ratios change as the 
government protection level varies over the next five years. The process of combining the 
impacts works as follows. First, when the target price changes from the current level of 
$3.92/bushel down to $2.86/bushel, the loan rate remains at $2.86/bushel. Therefore, the price 
range from $3.92 to $2.86 on the horizontal axis represents impacts from reducing the CCP’s 
target price. When the target price drops below $2.86, the CCP actually has a zero value and no 
longer plays a role in hedging decision. Thereafter, the loan rate varies from $2.86 to $0, 
reflecting a decreasing level of protection from the LDP. When the loan rate finally reaches $0,   26
the LDP drops out of the hedging decision. No more direct price protection is available in 
government programs at this point.  
From Figure 9, the pattern for target price variation is different than for the loan rate. 
From $0 to $2.86, hedge ratios decrease at an increasing rate as more price protection from 
government programs becomes available, implying an increasing substitution effect of LDP for 
hedging. When the loan rate is $0, hedging is the only way to reduce price risk and the optimal 
hedge ratio for each year reaches the highest possible level of around 0.78. This maximum level 
is determined by the correlation between the cash and futures prices as well as the transaction 
cost level. Also as the loan rate increases, hedge ratios for the later years drop faster than those 
for the earlier years. Again, this is because early resolution of risk is preferred to late resolution.  
From $2.86 to $3.92, the impact of the CCP’s target price enters the hedging decisions 
but takes effect step by step. From a target price level of $2.86 to almost $3.52, the CCP does not 
impact hedging. The hedge ratios essentially remain at the same level. This is from the impact of  
the $0.52 direct payment (PD)
11. Starting from $3.52, the target price begins to exceed the 
threshold. Hedge ratios drop rapidly until finally reaching 0.30~0.42, indicating an increasing 
influence from CCP on the risk management decisions and a greater substitution of CCP for 
hedging.  
In summary, optimal hedging is sensitive to variations in the LDP loan rate and the CCP 
target price. Results indicate a strong substitution effect from the government LDP and CCP for 
hedging in terms of price risk protection. The impacts appear somewhat stronger in the later 
years than in the early years.  
                                                 
11 As defined early, CCP takes effect after a “trigger price” is reached, i.e. CCPt = 0.85×0.935×Et-1(Yt) 
×max[0, PT - PD - max(Pt ,LR)] therefore CCP > 0 only if PT – (PD + max(Pt ,LR)) > 0. When PT is greater 
than LR but (PT – max(Pt ,LR)) less than PD of $0.52, CCP always yields a zero value. So there is no 
income improvement to the farmer.   27
Relative Impacts of Hedging, Crop Insurance, and Government Programs  
We consider four major cases, $0.017 vs. $0 hedging transaction cost, paired with 0% 
and 30% insurance premium loadings respectively, as shown in Table 5 and 6. Under each case, 
we set the base portfolio scenario as a full set of futures contract, crop insurance, and all three 
government programs (DP, LDP, CCP). Then from the base scenario, we reduce one instrument 
at a time to study the marginal effect of that instrument.  
We design five risk management portfolios for the farmer. In addition to the optimal 
hedge ratios and crop insurance ratios, we also compute a CE using equation (5). CE serves not 
only as a measurement of welfare improvement, but also as a criterion to assess the relative 
effectiveness of the tools to the farmer.   
We start with the most complete set of risk management tools. In the base scenario with 
a $0.017/bushel transaction cost (Table 5, upper panel), optimal hedge ratios range from 25% to 
32% over years. The CE of this full portfolio is $62.28, the highest among all portfolios. As we 
decrease the availability of government programs by taking away CCP first and then LDP, hedge 
ratios generally increase from around 30% to 40% to around 60% to 75%, to cover the extra risk. 
Correspondingly, without the support of CCP and LDP, the CE of the portfolios also decreases a 
lot by more than 50% from $62.28 to $34.58. When the DP is also eliminated, hedge ratios 
increase very slightly instead, which is due to the farmer’s tightened budget on transaction costs. 
Without any government payments, the farmer has less wealth and is not willing to pay the 
futures transaction cost. There is a different result for the scenario when there is no transaction 
cost (Table 5, lower panel). The hedge ratios are about the same with or without the DP.    28
Although the insurance premium loading doesn’t seem to affect the optimal coverage 
level, it affects the farmer’s evaluation of the welfare improvement due to insurance. Higher 
premium loading yields a smaller value of the insurance product in all portfolios.. 
As we take away the payment programs one by one, the change in CE discloses 
information about the specific values of each program. For example, the difference between the 
first two portfolios indicates a CCP value of $13.46 (62.28-48.82) to the farmer. We compute all 
these values and report them in Table 6. Among the three government programs, the DP has a 
highest value, while the CCP has a value close to the LDP. In total government programs 
account for $57.47, which is more than 90% of the total value of the base portfolio ($62.68). 
When we take away all government programs, the farmer relies on hedging and 
insurance. He or she can still find a hedging path and rely on the highest 85% insurance coverage 
to manage risks but achieves a much lower welfare level (CE=$4.81). The value of hedging can 
be calculated when we consider another portfolio of only crop insurance and government 
programs (CE=62.20). The difference between the CE of this last portfolio and that of the 
comprehensive base portfolio ($62.28) yields $0.08. The low value of hedging is not too 
surprising considering farmers’ low participation rates. However, the value is quite low even 
though they hedge at a significant percentage. Compared to insurance and government programs, 
futures is the only tool that does not receive any subsidy while paying a transaction cost. 
Considering that insurance is limited to yield insurance, the value of hedging may go even lower 
when revenue insurance is included. Correspondingly, when the value of CI is computed by 
subtracting the total government programs’ value from this last value, it turns out to be $4.73 
($62.20-$57.47) under 0% premium loading and $4.60 ($62.07-$57.47) under 30% premium 
loading. These values are a lot less than the individual government programs but still   29
significantly larger than hedging in the value of the full portfolio. This indicates that to the 
farmer, an income transfer in terms of subsidy is more valuable than risk reduction of a non-
subsidized instrument like hedging. 
Next we take off the transaction cost so hedging has no cost to the farmer. We see from 
Table 5 lower panel that optimal hedge ratios generally increase significantly. The rate of the 
increase slows down when hedge ratios get close to 79%. The values of the portfolios also 
increase slightly when the farmer saves money on hedging. The optimal insurance coverage ratio 
still stays at 85% with both 0% and 30% premium loadings, implying that the gain from saving 
on hedging still cannot replace the possible loss from lower insurance coverage.  
The CE values of each risk management tool change slightly except for hedging (Table 
6). The value of hedging goes up by about 35%. Despite that, the ranking of the values for these 
tools stays the same, that is, government programs (DP + LDP + CCP) > CI > hedging.  
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study we apply the GEU maximization framework to analyze a risk management 
problem related to wheat production in the PNW. A representative soft white wheat grower in 
Whitman County and Grant County, Washington, maximizes his or her utility by selecting an 
optimal portfolio of risk management tools including hedging in the futures market, purchasing 
crop insurance, and participating in government commodity programs. The GEU model allows 
the decision maker to completely specify risk preference, time preference, and intertemporal 
substitution preference. It also incorporates other common expected utility maximization models 
like CES-EU and MR-EU models as special cases. A very popular but different type of static EU 
(MA-EU) model is also added for comparison purpose.   30
We solve the maximization problem numerically based on simulated yield and price 
data for the next five years. Stochastic trends are used in the simulation of Grant County yield, 
Portland cash price, and CBOT futures price, based on historical data.  
We find optimal solutions for farmers in both Whitman County and Grant County vary 
with model specifications, reinforcing the importance of appropriate model selection and 
parameterization. Comparing the GEU model with other EU models shows that the general form 
of GEU has advantages in incorporating more preference information about the decision maker.  
The commonly used MA-EU model gives almost the same results when the risk aversion is 
specified at the same level as in the CES-EU, indicating that these two types of models might be 
interchangeable.  However, these results are different than the GEU model when the preferences 
parameters are set at different levels.  To conclude, (1) GEU is more general and can incorporate 
more flexible preference, (2) the commonly used additive EU models may yield biased results 
relative to the decisions based on the true preference. The results are completely different in the 
risk neutral and perfect substitution MR-GEU setting.  
The optimal choice of the hedging ratios is around 30% and that of the crop insurance 
purchase is always 85% in both counties. These levels are in line with the existing static one 
period studies. The subsidy in crop insurance overshadows its risk management feature so that 
the optimal insurance coverage is invariant with respect to the preference alternatives. 
Based on GEU framework, we investigate the impacts of intertemporal preferences, 
hedging and crop insurance costs, and U.S. government payment programs on the risk 
management behavior of a Whitman County wheat producer.  
The GEU framework has flexibility in the parameterization of the farmer’s preferences 
towards risk, timing, and intertemporal substitutability of consumption. We employ this feature   31
to examine the impacts of changes in these preferences on farmers’ optimal hedging and crop 
insurance participation. Preference impact analysis implies that optimal hedging behavior of the 
representative farmer is sensitive to intertemporal preferences changes. Risk aversion appears to 
have a larger effect on hedge ratios than time preference and intertemporal substitution. Each of 
the preferences has its own impact pattern. But even in the separate analyses, the effect is often 
intertwined with influences from the other preferences due to relative value changes.  
The market institution impact analysis shows that hedging transaction costs negatively 
affect optimal hedge ratios and reduces the farmer’s welfare level. When crop insurance is 
coupled with a premium subsidy, even an insurance premium loading of 30% is not enough to 
keep the farmer from purchasing the highest available level of insurance coverage. However, the 
premium loading definitely reduces welfare. The impact analysis of government price protection 
parameters, the target price and loan rate, indicates that both of them are influential in hedging 
decisions. The corresponding government LDP and CCP have increasing substitution impact on 
hedging as the price protection level increases.  
The relative impact analysis of current risk management tools shows both crop 
insurance and government programs are influential to the farmer’s welfare improvement. 
Hedging has very limited contribution. In terms of the ranking of the value of these tools, the 
government programs (DP + LDP + CCP) have a greater effect on farmers’ welfare than crop 
insurance, and crop insurance outperforms hedging. Yield insurance has a greater value than DP, 
LDP, or CCP separately, but less than the three combined. Among the three government 
programs, the DP has higher a value than the respective values of the LDP and the CCP for the 
representative farmer.  
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Figure 3. Stochastic Trend Model Fitting for Grant Wheat Yield (1972-2003) 


































Note: The lower bound and upper bound are based on 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Stochastic Trend Model Fitting for Wheat Cash Prices (1973 to 2003) 
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Table 1.  Stochastic Trend Estimation of Historical Yield and Price Data 

























0 β   0.73 (1.00)  0.94 (1.16)  -0.04 (1.02)  -0.03 (1.11) 
ε σ   7.13
**(0.63) 6.92
**(1.46)  0.00 (1.02)  0.00 (0.23) 




ς σ   0.00 (0.03)  0.00 (0.25)  0.00 (0.07)  0.00 (0.07) 
 
Note: 1. Standard errors of the estimates are included in the parentheses. 
2. “*” denotes the estimate is statistically significant at 0.10 level, and “**” denotes 






























Whitman Simulated Yield (bushel/acre) 
 
Grant Simulated Yield (bushel/acre) 
Mean 75.28  75.93  76.77 77.36 78.24 75.19 76.27 76.30 77.34 78.02 
Std  Dev.  7.26  7.22  7.28  7.06 7.23 7.49 8.15 8.36 9.46 9.65 
Skewness  -0.01  -0.03  0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.02 




Portland Cash Price (dollar/bushel) 
 
CBOT Futures Price (dollar/bushel) 
Mean  3.93  3.86  3.82  3.79 3.77 3.56 3.51 3.49 3.46 3.44 
Std  Dev.  0.66  0.91  1.07  1.21 1.34 0.68 0.96 1.15 1.29 1.44 
Skewness  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.05 
Kurtosis  -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.20  -0.12  0.03  0.01  -0.20  -0.26  -0.31  
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Table 3. Optimal Hedge Ratio and Crop Insurance Coverage: Model Comparison  
 




















         
 
GEU full 
(α= -0.13, β = 0.89, ρ = 0.9493) 
 
0.25 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.26   0.85 
CES-EU 
(α = ρ = -1, β = 0.89) 
 
0.29 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.22   0.85 
MR-EU 
(α = ρ = 1, β = 0.89) 
 
0 0 0 0 0    0.85 
MA-EU 
(α = -1, U(C) = -1/C, β = 0.89) 
 
0.29 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.22   0.85 
Grant County           
 
GEU full 
(α= -0.13, β = 0.89, ρ = 0.9493) 
 
0.25 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.24   0.85 
CES-EU 
(α = ρ = -1, β = 0.89) 
 
0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.21   0.85 
MR-EU 
(α = ρ = 1, β = 0.89) 
 
0 0 0 0 0    0.85 
MA-EU 
(α = -1, U(C) = -1/C, β = 0.89) 
 
0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.21   0.85  
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Table 4.  Summarized Optimal Hedge Ratio in Response to Transaction Cost 
   
Note: The hedging transaction cost varies from $0/bushel to $0.02/bushel. 
 

























Max  0.4221 0.3862 0.3655 0.3523 0.2679 
Min  0.4195 0.3849 0.3648 0.3517 0.2676 
Range  0.0026 0.0013 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002 
 

























Max  0.6119 0.5405 0.4976 0.4784 0.3935 
Min  0.6083 0.5389 0.4967 0.4776 0.3932 
Range  0.0036 0.0016 0.0009 0.0008 0.0003   49
 
Table 5. Impacts of Market Institutions and Government Policies on  






























With Transaction Cost ($0.017/Bushel) 
 













H & CI & G(DP, LDP)  0.39  0.44  0.44  0.44  0.38  0.85 
H & CI & G(DP)  0.28  0.57  0.65  0.72  0.74  0.85 
H  &  CI  0.32 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.74  0.85 














Without Transaction Cost ($0/bushel) 
 













H & CI & G(DP, LDP)  0.61  0.54  0.50  0.48  0.39  0.85 
H & CI & G(DP)  0.78  0.79  0.77  0.79  0.77  0.85 
H  &  CI  0.78 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.77  0.85 


















Table 6. Evaluation of Risk Management Instruments 
 
 
$0.017/bushel Futures Transaction Cost 
  
$0/bushel Futures Transaction Cost 
Alternative Instruments 
 
$ 0% premium loading  30% premium loading   
 
$ 0% premium loading  30% premium loading 
 
Gov’t programs (total, $) 
 
57.47  57.47     57.00  57.00  
CCP   13.46  13.46     13.29   13.29 
LDP   14.24   14.24     13.94  13.94  
DP 29.78    29.78    29.77  29.77 
Crop Insurance (MPCI, $)  4.73   4.60     5.20  5.07  
Hedging ($)  0.08   0.08    0.48  0.48 
 
 
 
 
 
  